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for the President
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C O N T E N T S

PRELIMINARY PLAN, ARMAMENT AND ARMED FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM,
ARMY PLAN (Top Secret No. 4304)

General Walter B. Smith, Task Force Chairman

INSPECTION AND CONTROL PLAN, NAVY (Top Secret No. 4305)

Admiral Oswald S. Colclough, Task Force Chairman

FINAL REPORT, TASK FORCE ON AIR INSPECTION (Top Secret No. 119)

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PRELIMINARY STUDY OF COMMUNICATIONS (Secret)

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THE ARMY SECTION PLAN
for the
ARMAMENT AND ARMED FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM

OUTLINE

	<u>Page</u>
I. Problem.	1
II. Facts Bearing on the Problem	1
III. Discussion	2
IV. Concept - Joint Inspection System.	7
V. Concept - Army Section of Inspection System	
1. Organization	13
2. Communications	14
3. Personnel.	17
4. Administrative and Logistical Support	18
5. Cost Analysis.	18
6. Rights, Powers and Privileges.	19
7. Supplementary Information.	19
VI. Conclusions.	19
VII. Recommendations.	24
 Inclosure: List of Appendices	 11

- 1 -

TS-4304-

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDICES

	<u>Page</u>
A. Outline Plan for Implementation of the President's Geneva Proposal.	25
B. The Organization to Support the Mission	
Incl. 1 -- US(Western Powers) Inspection System. . .	29
Incl. 2 -- International Armaments Commission	30
Incl. 3 -- US (Western Powers) Inspection Headquarters	31
Incl. 4 -- US (Western Powers) Inspection Mission . .	32
Incl. 5 -- US (Western Powers) Area Headquarters. . .	33
Incl. 6 -- Military District Inspection Groups. . . .	34
Incl. 7 -- Verification Teams	35
Incl. 8 -- Observer Teams	36
C. Major Functions of Organization Sub-divisions.	37
D. Station Lists: Joint and Army Headquarters of the Inspection System	41
E. Stages of Disclosure and Verification.	43
F. A Plan for the Administrative and Logistical Support	48
G. Communications.	58
H. Army Personnel Requirements	59
I. Initial Requirements for Major Items of Equipment. .	60
J. Cost Analysis	61
K. Rights, Powers, and Privileges of the Inspection Organization and Its Personnel	71
L. Supplementary Information	74

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

THE ARMY SECTION PRELIMINARY PLAN
for the
ARMAMENT AND ARMED FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM

I. PROBLEM

1. To design in specific terms the Army section of a practical, effective and comprehensive armament and armed force inspection system within the USSR (and its satellite states) which does not depend on good faith for effective operation, and the reciprocal pattern of which would be feasible and acceptable within the United States (and its Western Allies), for the purpose of improving the prospects of a durable peace

- a. through identifying violations of agreements,
- b. limiting the chances for signatory nations to mount surprise attack, and
- c. providing an effective early warning system.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- 2. Memorandum: "Implementation of NSC Action No. 1419", revised 5 August 1955, is the basis for this report.
- 3. Mr. Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, on August 30, 1955, proposed to the United Nations Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission an outline

- 1 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

plan for the implementation of the 21 July 1955 Presidential proposal at Geneva regarding disarmament. (Appendix A).

III. DISCUSSION

4. Objective. The primary objective to be accomplished by an inspection system must be to insure against the possibility of a surprise attack by nuclear or conventional means. The long range objective is to improve the prospects of a durable peace by verification of compliance with all disclosures and agreements relative to armaments within the USSR and its satellites.

5. Assumptions. It is assumed that the U. S. and USSR (and in all likelihood, other nations within both the Western Powers Group and the Russian orbit) have agreed,

a. To the exchange of "Blueprints" of armaments and armed forces in accordance with the President's proposal at Geneva and within the terms of a negotiated agreement pursuant thereto.

b. To a limitation of armaments at a mutually satisfactory level, which could possibly lead to later reductions.

c. Reciprocally, to establish the herein described inspection system in the stages proposed, with appropriate inspection elements in being and ready for operation prior to the initial and each successive disclosure stage.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

6. Principles for the Development of the Inspection System.

The following principles are considered essential to the development of a comprehensive and effective inspection system.

a. The primary purpose of the Inspection System is to provide against surprise attack by detecting at inception any and all evidences of evasion of agreements or hostile intent.

b. Aerial surveillance supplemented by information derived from aerial photography and other aerial detection media is not in itself adequate to the accomplishment of the inspection objectives. A widely dispersed inspection organization employing integrated military ground, sea and air as well as civilian elements is necessary.

c. The over-all inspection system should be a single composite organization consisting jointly of U. S. and other signatory Western Powers personnel, both uniformed and civilian.

d. The inspection organization should be controlled centrally with over-all direction exercised by the U. S. from Washington through a single command channel. Accordingly, the U. S. should seek agreement with other signatory Western Powers by which the U. S. would be delegated the executive authority for the management of the inspection system. In the event this is not agreed, all peculiarly American interests should

TOP SECRET

be controlled and coordinated through a single chain of command.

e. The personnel of the various headquarters, and of the verification and observation teams of the inspection system should be predominately American because of the high stake of the U. S. in the undertaking.

f. Submitted military blueprints should be verified by the use of:

(1) An aerial inspection program.

(2) An on-the-ground team inspection organization with observers and technical inspectors positioned prior to the beginning of the verification processes and remaining in adequate numbers at least until some concrete hope of reaching ultimate goals is in sight.

g. Inspection should be accomplished in concurrent, progressive stages; action in each stage to be initiated and proceed simultaneously within the several countries being inspected. Definite time limits should be established for the completion of each stage so as to expedite the inspection processes.

h. A communications system which will insure full and free exchange of information among the field elements and with all higher headquarters and home countries should be established.

- 4 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

i. Logistical support for the inspection system and its personnel should be provided on a national basis insofar as practicable. Support for the American elements should be by a designated armed service on a reimburseable basis.

7. Test of the Inspection System. In the formulation of this plan the adoption initially of some limited form of inspection for test purposes has been considered. The British have made a concrete proposal in this regard. Another proposal much more restricted in its aspects has been under study by American elements. While such a test would be valuable in that it would afford a dress rehearsal of a cross-section of a possible final type system, it has the following obvious inherent disadvantages:

a. The basic purpose of the system (i.e. warning of surprise attack) could not be accomplished, and

b. Cooperation by USSR during the test would not necessarily assure cooperation during a later full implementation of the system.

Further, it would delay for a considerable period, possibly for several years, the installation of a fully desirable system. All the benefits to be derived from such a test inspection could be achieved better during the initial stage of a fully implemented system. Furthermore, under these circumstances,

- 5 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

procedural defects could be determined more readily and timely on-the-spot corrective action facilitated.

8. Participation of Other Powers. It is difficult to conceive that any inspection system could be limited to the U. S. and USSR even in the beginning. Many U. S. bases are on foreign soil. The USSR could neither be expected to exclude these bases of potential surprise attack, neither could the U. S. agree to inspection of such bases without consulting the countries in which they are located. Likewise, the USSR could not be expected to exclude the armaments and armed forces of other Western Powers, especially the major powers. While the U. S. and USSR conceivably might be the principals in an original inspection agreement, any subsequent agreements to be fully effective, would have to be international in scope, involving as a minimum, the Western States on the one side, and Soviet satellite countries on the other. Accordingly, this plan assumes that Western Power countries and the USSR satellite countries will participate in the inspection system from its inception. If, for any reason, participation in the system is initially limited to the U. S. and the USSR, the plan described herein could be placed into effect with minor modifications. However, any such limited system would be totally incapable of assuring early warning against a surprise attack which could be mounted or supported

TOP SECRET

from within satellite countries.

9. Reciprocal Provisions of the System. It is important to bear in mind that the provisions of any armaments convention and inspection system ensuing therefrom are to be reciprocal in all aspects. This applies to such things as internal organization of the system, number and locations of on-the-spot observers, stages of disclosure and verification, and the rights, powers and privileges of the inspection organization and its personnel. For example, if the U. S. plan provides for six intermediate (area) headquarters within USSR, we should expect the Russians to insist on a like number of the same type headquarters in the U. S. If insistence is placed upon the inclusion of the armaments and armed forces of the Russian satellite states, then in the most literal manner must we expect that the Russians will insist that the system cover our allied countries. It is of primary importance, therefore, in negotiating any agreement for an inspection system, that constant consideration be given to the impact of reciprocal arrangements upon the American people and the American military establishment.

IV. CONCEPT - JOINT INSPECTION ORGANIZATION

10. General. The over-all inspection organization should be joint and incorporate the requirements of all its component elements. There follows an outline of such an organization

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

which insures accomplishment of the inspection mission at minimum cost in personnel, time, and funds, and should be acceptable on a reciprocal basis as between the U. S. (Western Powers) and the USSR (Soviet satellites).

11. Basic Principles of the Organization. The concept of the Joint Inspection Organization is based on the following principles.

a. An inspection organization including integrated military ground, sea and air, as well as specialized civilian elements is necessary.

b. The over-all inspection system should be a single composite organization, insofar as its incorporated missions permit, and consist jointly of U. S. and other signatory Western Powers personnel, both uniformed and civilian.

c. The personnel of the various headquarters, and inspection and observer teams of the inspection system should be predominately American because of the high stake of the U. S. in the undertaking.

d. All echelons and units of the inspection organization, both within the U. S. and USSR and its satellites should be staffed and operated on a joint basis with appropriate, and proportionate representation from military and specialized civilian elements.

e. The inspection organization should be controlled centrally with over-all direction exercised by the U.S. from Washington.

TOP SECRET

f. A communications system which will insure full and free exchange of information among the field elements and with all higher headquarters and home countries should be established.

g. Logistical support of the inspection organization and its personnel should be provided on a national basis insofar as practicable. Support of the American element should be by a designated armed service on a reimburseable basis.

12. The Organization to Support the Objective. (See Appendix B, Inclosure 1, Chart - "U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection System").

a. The inspection organization schematically charted in the above-mentioned annex is in line with the principles stated in paragraph 6, above. Detailed organizations of the various headquarters and teams along with a statement of major functions are listed as follows:

Appendix B, Incl. 2	International Armaments Commission
Appendix B, Incl. 3	U.S. (Western Powers) Inspection Headquarters
Appendix B, Incl. 4	U.S. (Western Powers) Inspection Mission
Appendix B, Incl. 5	U.S. (Western Powers) Area Headquarters
Appendix B, Incl. 6	Military District Inspection Groups
Appendix B, Incl. 7	Verification Teams
Appendix B, Incl. 8	Observer Teams
Appendix C	Major Functions of Organization Subdivision

b. It is contemplated, on the basis of best information available, that headquarters of the above-listed subdivisions will be located as follows:

International Armaments Commission--Switzerland.
U.S. (Western Powers) Inspection Headquarters--Washington, D. C.
U.S. (Western Powers) Inspection Mission--Moscow (USSR).
U.S. (Western Powers) Area Headquarters (See Appendix D for Station Lists of Joint and Army Headquarters).

TOP SECRET

U.S. Military District Inspection Groups. (See Appendix D, for Station Lists of Joint and Army Headquarters).

c. It is emphasized that the above-described organization, including on-the-spot observers, must be in place and ready to function on the date agreed upon for commencement of the inspection system.

13. Extent of Disclosure and Verification:

a. The system of disclosure and verification must be on a continuing basis. Disclosure as of a particular date on a "one-time basis" and subsequent verification of such disclosure would not meet the requirements and hence would require a continuing program. Therefore, it is contemplated that the machinery which will be set up should be permanent, or at least on a long term basis, since the disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments will be on a continuing basis.

b. The disclosure, verification and on-the-spot surveillance must cover all armed forces and armament of every kind including para-military, security and police forces, and all armaments including nuclear. It is obvious that disclosure of such information to a foreign power is contrary to U. S. laws and no doubt the same fact applies to Russia and other foreign powers. Since we would have to secure Congressional approval, we may encounter difficulties on the political front. It is likely that

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

necessary legal approval would present fewer obstructions to the authoritarian Communist Government. Other parliamentary systems may be confronted with problems approaching those of the U. S. in difficulty.

14. Stages of Disclosure and Verification.

a. Disclosure and verification must be carried out step by step with appropriate provisions for proceeding to the next step when and only when previous steps have been completed satisfactorily by the signatory nations. A definite time limit should be established for the completion of each stage.

b. Appendix E, sets forth in outline the extent of forces and armaments to be disclosed in the respective stages and the manner of verification of the information required to be disclosed.

c. In considering the appropriate number of stages, the figure five was determined to represent the minimum number consistent with the following considerations:

(1) Disclosure and verification should proceed from the less secret areas in the early stages to the more secret areas.

(2) A phasing of this nature, in addition to furnishing the best test of the good faith of all states, would cause the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country.

d. It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification processes with respect to all adhering states should begin simultaneously, go forward at approximately the same tempo, and be concluded with the utmost dispatch.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

15. Communications. A communications system which will insure full and free exchange of information among all field elements and with all higher headquarters and home countries is an absolute necessity.

16. Administrative and Logistical Support. Appendix F, contains a plan for the Administrative and Logistical Support to the Inspection System. In arriving at this plan, consideration was given to the following principles:

- a. Administrative and logistical support will be provided by a designated Armed Service on a reimburseable basis.
- b. The designated Armed Service will be responsible for support of all elements of the inspection service.
- c. Acceptable standards for installations and facilities in general will be that established for military posts throughout the United States.
- d. Initially, installations and services may be acquired on a rental basis through USSR authorities. In event rental facilities are inadequate, a construction program which would provide installations and facilities of American standards should be initiated. Planning to this end should begin as early as possible.
- e. In event Western Powers personnel participate in the inspection system, logistical support primarily will be on a national basis.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

f. Provisions of logistical support should be based principally on U. S. military depots in West Germany and France. A special agreement with each of those countries to make this possible may be necessary.

V. CONCEPT--ARMY SECTION OF THE JOINT INSPECTION ORGANIZATION

17. General. The mission of the Army Section of the Armaments and Armed Force Inspection System is to:

a. Verify disclosed data on Army installations, armament and armed forces including organized reserves, para-military, security and police forces; perform such other inspection and surveillance tasks as it can or may be called upon for other elements of the inspection system.

b. Detect any

(1) Indications of surprise attack, nuclear or conventional, evidenced by but not confined to:

(a) Undue or threatening troop or weapon buildup, concentrations or related activities.

(b) Abnormal movement of armaments or armed forces.

(c) Indication of production of armaments in greater numbers than required for normal replacement and for normal reserve stockpiles.

- 13 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(d) Undisclosed research and development or testing which could be expected to have military implications.

(e) Evasion of agreements or evidence of clandestine hostile action.

18. Organization for Accomplishing the Mission. (Appendix B, Inclosure 1,) "U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection System", describes the over-all organization essential to the accomplishment of the inspection mission. Major organizational elements of this system are jointly and proportionately staffed by incorporated American elements and may, at any point, include personnel of signatory Western Powers. The organization described below considers only the Army aspects of the inspection system and its requirements at each organizational level.

a. Area sub-divisions. For the purposes of facilitating control, USSR will be divided into six (6) areas and each headed by a U. S. (Western Powers) Area Headquarters (Appendix B, Inclosure 5). In determining these areas consideration has been given to such factors as territorial military subdivisions, troop density, road and rail systems as well as to the reciprocal impact of a similar Russian organization upon the U. S. In addition to the six areas in the USSR proper, one (1) Area Headquarters will be established in East Berlin (Germany) for the supervision of Military District inspection activities within the USSR satellite

TOP SECRET

countries. Basically, each Area Headquarters will direct its inspection activities through its subordinate Military District Inspection Groups.

b. Military District Inspection Group Sub-divisions. The area sub-divisions which lie within the USSR will be sub-divided into twenty-three (23) inspection districts and each headed by a Military District Inspection Group (Appendix B, Inclosure 6). The East Berlin Area will include the four (4) Military Districts which lie within the satellite countries. The selection of these districts takes into consideration the same factors that were utilized in the selection of areas. Each District Headquarters is responsible for verification and surveillance activities pertaining to the Soviet Army within its respective territory.

c. Verification Teams. (Appendix B, Inclosure 7). Verification Teams, under the direction of respective District Headquarters would verify military blueprints submitted as a part of the agreed reciprocal exchange. In addition, these teams would be required to inspect areas which, by virtue of aerial reconnaissance, were suspected of including installations either undisclosed on the military blueprint or of such size as to indicate inaccuracy or inadequacy in disclosed information.

d. Observer Teams. (Appendix B, Inclosure 8). In addition to the Verification Teams in each District, there would be included an appropriate number of Observer Teams. These Teams

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

would be posted at key locations such as mobilization centers, military depots, road and rail centers, telecommunications centers, specified military establishments, and guided missile centers, with free access to such other objects or indicators of surprise attack as might need to be held under observation. In addition, these teams would perform such verification functions as might lie within their capabilities. The primary purpose of these teams is to give early warning of evidences of hostile intent, evasion of the agreement, clandestine operations, and significant repositioning of ground forces.

(1) Verification and observation will be accomplished in concurrent, progressive stages (Appendix E). Action in each stage will be initiated simultaneously and proceed concurrently within

(a) the USSR and U.S. if accomplished under an exclusive bilateral agreement, or

(b) the states of the signatory Western Powers and those of the Russian satellite countries under a multi-national agreement.

(2) Information obtained by the Verification and Observer Teams will be transmitted to the District Headquarters. There it will be correlated, consolidated, analyzed and transmitted to the Area Headquarters for evaluation and forwarding to the U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection Mission in Moscow.

TOP SECRET

19. Communications. For the verification and observation of USSR units and facilities to be of maximum value it is essential that a communications network be established which will permit flash warnings as well as routine transmission of information gathered to higher headquarters. Each Verification and Observer Team should have free access at any stage of the inspection to such areas or installations as necessary to assure that the coverage contemplated by the terms of the agreement for that particular stage is complete. Each team should be provided with mobile radio equipment capable of transmitting warning and reports to the District Headquarters and to a control location within a signatory Western Power in an emergency. Communications equipment at District and higher headquarters should be of the fixed type and capable of transmission with all U. S. (Western Powers) networks in the European area. Appendix G provides a detailed synopsis of communications requirements.

20. Personnel. Appendix H, presents a detailed summary of Army personnel requirements.

a. The basic estimate of personnel for implementation of the Army element of the inspection organization does not include communications personnel at the headquarters of the twenty eight (28) Military Districts, the seven(7) Area Headquarters and the headquarters in Moscow, since it is probable that many of these

- 17 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

facilities would be jointly manned. Further, commercial facilities together with the necessary personnel may be employed. However, in event that solely Army facilities are installed, additional personnel would be required in the numbers shown in the Grand Total.

b. The problems of obtaining suitable qualified personnel, both military and specialized civilian, for an organization of this type would be similar to those encountered in staffing of projects in other areas of the world, however, due to the unique aspects of the proposed inspection system, the difficulties may be expected to be considerably aggravated. This problem is discussed in greater detail in Appendix L.

21. Administrative and Logistical Support. Appendix F, provides a plan for the Administrative and Logistical Support of the Inspection System, and Appendix I, presents estimates of initial requirements of major items of equipment.

22. Cost Analysis. A generalized analysis of initial and annual recurring costs of the Army element of the inspection organization is set forth in Appendix J. In view of the many intangibles, such as the exchange rate, lack of definite determination of number, type and source of installations, the costs cited are subject to revision as better information becomes available.

- 18 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

23. Rights, Powers, and Privileges. Appendix K, outlines the rights, powers and privileges of Inspection Elements and assigned personnel and defines their status in general terms. These will have to be supplemented and spelled out carefully in the terms of the agreement.

24. Supplementary Information. Section IV of the Memorandum "Implementation of NSC Action No. 1419, revised August 4, 1955", the basic directive for the Army Task Group, requested information on several specific subjects. While these matters are treated generally throughout this preliminary plan, for clarity and emphasis the answers are consolidated in Appendix L.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

25. Incident to the formulation of the Army section of the plan for an Armament and Armed Force Inspection System within the USSR (and its satellite states) it is concluded that:

a. Objective: The immediate and continuing objective is to insure against the possibility of a surprise attack by nuclear or conventional means. The long-range objective is to improve the prospects of a durable peace by verification of compliance with all disclosures and agreements relative to armaments within the USSR and its satellites and thereby establish, through demonstration of good faith, a sound foundation for a further arms limitation program.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

b. General Principles.

(1) A widely dispersed inspection organization employing integrated military ground, sea, air and specialized civilian elements is necessary to the accomplishment of the inspection objectives. The numerical strength of the organization will depend upon the extent of the inspection coverage at any one time.

(2) The over-all inspection system should be a single composite organization consisting jointly of U. S. and other signatory Western Powers personnel, both uniformed and civilian.

(3) The inspection organization should be controlled centrally by the U. S. from Washington through a single command channel. In implementation of this, the U. S. should seek agreement with other signatory Western Powers whereby the U. S. would be delegated executive authority for the management of the inspection system.

(4) Personnel of the various headquarters, and verification and observer teams of the inspection system should be predominately American.

(5) Submitted military blueprints should be verified by the use of:

(a) An aerial inspection program.

(b) An on-the-ground inspection and verification organization positioned prior to the beginning of the verification processes.

TOP SECRET

(6) Inspection should be accomplished in concurrent, progressive stages. A definite time limit should be established for the completion of each stage.

(7) A communications system which will insure full and free exchange of information is required.

(8) Logistical support of the inspection system should be on a national basis. American elements should be supported by a designated service on a reimburseable basis.

c. Test of the Inspection System. Any test of the system prior to actual implementation, even in limited form, would be of dubious value. Further, such a test would delay for a considerable period, possibly for several years, the installation of a fully desirable system. All the benefits to be derived from such a test could be reached better during the initial stage of a fully implemented system.

d. Participation of Other Powers. Inasmuch as both the U.S. and USSR have military bases on foreign soil, any inspection system which does not include the Western Powers and Russian satellite countries would be totally incapable of assuring early warning against surprise attacks.

e. Reciprocal Provisions of the System. In negotiating any agreement for an inspection system, constant consideration must be given to the impact of reciprocal arrangements upon the American people and the American military establishment.

- 21 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

f. Organization to Support the Objective. The organization described in Appendix B, formulated in line with the principles listed in sub-paragraph b, above, and with functions as stated in Appendix C, is designed to carry out the objective of the inspection system.

g. Extent of Disclosure and Verification. Disclosure, verification and on-the-spot surveillance must be on a continuing basis and cover all armed forces and armament of every kind including para-military, security and police forces, and all armaments including nuclear.

h. Stages of Disclosure and Verification.

(1) Disclosure and verification

(a) Must be carried out step by step with provisions for proceeding to the next step when and only when previous steps have been satisfactorily completed by the signatory nations. Definite time limits should be established for the completion of each stage so as to expedite the inspection process.

(b) Should proceed by steps from the less secret stages to the more secret areas.

(c) While testing the good faith of participating states, should cause the minimum degree of interference with the internal life of their people.

(2) The number of stages most consistent with the above considerations is five.

TOP SECRET

i. Administrative and Logistical Support.

(1) An Armed Service should be designated to provide administrative and logistical support for the inspection organization.

(2) Uniformed personnel, in numbers and types required, will be supplied by the Department of Defense under established policies and within special overstrength authorizations.

(3) Acceptable standards for installations and facilities in general will be that established for military posts throughout the United States. Rental facilities, equipment and services may be acquired initially. To the extent necessary these may be supplemented by an accelerated construction and supply program.

(4) Logistical support should be based principally on U. S. military depots in West Germany and France. A special agreement with each of these countries to make this possible may be necessary.

j. Army Personnel Requirements. Approximately 13,000 uniformed and/or civilian personnel will be required to staff the Army element of the proposed organization for accomplishing the inspection objectives. This estimate does include communications personnel at District and higher headquarters.

k. Cost Analysis. The costs of the Army element of the inspection organization are stated in Appendix J.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

1. Rights, Powers and Privileges. The rights, powers and privileges set forth in Appendix K, should be delineated carefully in the terms of the agreement.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

26. That the above conclusions constitute the Army Section Plan for the Armament and Armed Force Inspection System.

Inclousures: Appendices A to L

- 24 -

TOP SECRET

C O P Y

SECRET

APPENDIX A

UNITED NATIONS
DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

DC/SC.1/31
30 August 1955
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 21 JULY 1955 PRESIDENTIAL
PROPOSAL AT GENEVA REGARDING DISARMAMENT

1. Purpose. The purpose of this outline plan is to translate the proposal made by President Eisenhower on 21 July at Geneva into terms of reference, a concept, and an outline of procedures. The details are subject to negotiation within the principles stated by the President.

2. Terms of Reference.

a. The term "blueprint of military establishments" is defined as consisting of the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, including organized reserves and para-military; and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations.

b. Each nation has recognized the need for ground observers and these will be stationed at key locations within the other country for the purpose of allowing them to certify the accuracy of the foregoing information and to give warning of evidence of surprise attack or of mobilization.

c. Each country shall permit unrestricted, but monitored, aerial reconnaissance by visual, photographic, and electronic means by the other country.

- 25 -

SECRET

APPENDIX A

SECRET

APPENDIX A

DC/SC.1/31

English

Page 2

3. Concept. The United States and the USSR will exchange all data relative to military forces and installations which, coupled with measures for verification and surveillance, are essential to provide against the possibility of surprise attack. This exchange is to be accomplished in progressive steps as mutually agreed upon by the two Governments. Among the elements of information considered essential to preclude surprise attack and to be sought by an exchange between the Governments and to be verified and maintained under surveillance are:

- a. Weapons and delivery systems suitable for surprise attack.
- b. Transportation and telecommunications.
- c. Armed forces, structure and positioning of armed forces.
- d. Additional facilities as mutually agreed upon by the two Governments.

4. Initial Procedure.

- a. Exchange of "blueprints" of military establishments.

(1) The Governments of the United States and the USSR will each prepare lists of major military forces and establishments, showing the deployment of forces and the locations of installations and facilities by geographical co-ordinates.

- 26 -

SECRET

APPENDIX A

SECRET

APPENDIX A

DC/SC.1/31
English
Page 3

(2) Schedules will be drawn for time phasing of exchanges to assure simultaneous delivery of similar types of information by each Government, and completion of verification by each side before progressing to a subsequent phase. Provision for immediate spot-checking will be included.

b. Verification of "blueprints" of military establishments.

(1) Arrangements will be made for the posting of on-the-spot observers with operating land, sea, and air forces, at their supporting installations, and at key locations as necessary for the verification, continued observation, and reporting of each category of information. The number and location of the observers will be as mutually agreed upon prior to the exchange of information, and provisions will be made for changes in the location should the initial arrangements prove to be inadequate.

(2) Aerial reconnaissance will be conducted by each inspecting country on an unrestricted, but monitored, basis to augment the efforts of the posted observers. Each inspecting country will utilize its own aircraft and related equipment. Liaison personnel of the country being in-

- 27 -

SECRET

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

SECRET

DC/SC.1/31
English
Page 4

spected will be aboard each reconnaissance aircraft during all over-flights.

c. Facilities and services to be provided.

(1) Each sub-list of military installations will include the designation of one or more airfields or bases at which facilities will be made available for support of the aerial reconnaissance aircraft and crews.

d. Checks and controls.

Procedures will be established for:

(1) Designation of ports of entry and egress for incoming and departing observers and reconnaissance aircraft.

(2) Clearance of incoming and departing observers, aircraft and crews and arrangements for monitored passage to and from home territory.

(3) Check and identification of observers and reconnaissance aircraft, personnel and equipment engaged in this activity.

(4) Orientation of observers and reconnaissance personnel.


(5) Air traffic control of inspecting aircraft by host Government.

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- 28 -

SECRET


APPENDIX A

TOP SECRET
APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 1
U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection System



Inclosure 1
APPENDIX B


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APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 2
International Armaments Commission



TOP SECRET

APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 3

U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection Headquarters




Inclosure 3
APPENDIX B

TOP SECRET

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
APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 4
U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection Mission



TOP SECRET

APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 5


U. S. (Western Powers) Area Headquarters



TOP SECRET

APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 6

Military District Inspection Group



Notes

Inspection teams represent a joint effort of Army, Navy, Air, and technical civilian experts if and when needed. May also include liaison personnel of Western Powers.

Inclosure 6
APPENDIX B

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 7

Verification Team

*Commanding Officer

**Administration

***Operations

Nuclear

Signal

Ordnance

Quartermaster

Engineer

Medical

Transportation

Chemical

Total — 11 Officers

Notes

- * G-3 Background
- ** G-1 Background
- *** G-3 Background

Inclosure 7
APPENDIX B


-35-

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX B - INCLOSURE 8

Observer Team



Notes

Team based upon 24 hour surveillance — 2 Observers (1 Officer and 1 E. M. and Radio Operator) for each 8 hours.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX C

MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL SUB-DIVISIONS

International Armament Commission

Composed of representatives of participating nations. Located at agreed-upon site (in Switzerland or within partnership countries on a rotational basis). Sets policy and supervises enforcement of terms of the agreement. Receives and transmits disclosures and reports of verification. Receives complaints and arbitrates disputes.

U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection Headquarters

Composed of representatives of U. S. and associated allied countries. Located in Washington, if organized under an exclusive U.S.-USSR agreement--otherwise, at a site agreed upon by the partnership Western Powers. Compiles and transmits U. S. disclosures by stages; reports in advance to the International Armament Commission movements of U. S. standing armament in international air or water or on foreign land, water or air; receives and processes similar reports from the USSR; receives and processes Russian disclosures; supervises the operation of, and administers the U.S. Inspection Organization; orients, trains and indoctrinates assigned personnel; receives, analyzes and interprets reports received from the field agencies; formulates and presents complaints, if and as

- 37 -

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX C

TOP SECRET

they arise, to the International Armament Commission; maintains close liaison with, and receives maximum assistance from appropriate established U. S. Governmental agencies; institutes and maintains an active, effective, public relations and information program; directs the activities of and is the headquarters for the U. S. liaison group with the Russian Inspection Organization.

U. S. Liaison Groups With
Russian (Orbit) Inspection Mission

Provides proper administrative assistance and logistical support for the Russian (Orbit) Inspection Mission. Insures complete understanding on the part of the Russian (Orbit) Mission as to the extent of inspection coverage at each stage. Briefs inspectors prior to each inspection visit and provides a U. S. representative throughout the course of each inspection to facilitate their operations and hold them within inspection bounds. Accepts and processes Russian (Orbit) complaints; authorizes field liaison officers to make "on-the-spot" decisions; formulates and forwards to the International Control Headquarters complaints regarding the activities of the Russian (Orbit) personnel. Maintains surveillance over Russian (Orbit) personnel to guarantee knowledge of their activities and whereabouts at all times. Alerts each location to be inspected sufficiently in advance to insure readiness; transmits all pertinent instructions and Russian (Orbit) requests incidental to the scheduled inspection. Arranges for the conduct of press relations

TOP SECRET

relevant to inspection activities; empowers field liaison officers, under proper instructions, to deal directly with public and with local press representatives.

U. S. (Western Powers) Inspection Mission (USSR)

Composed of representatives of all American (Western Powers) inspection elements. Located at the seat of the Russian Government. Directs and controls activities of all U. S. Missions and their field elements; coordinates their administrative and logistical support. The Army Section, in addition to its responsibility for the inspection and surveillance of direct Army interests, conducts inspections of as much armaments production, research and testing, budget, procurement, medical, transportation, etc., activities as affect the Russian (Orbit) ground forces; cooperates with other sections in the discharge of the total Mission responsibility.

U. S. (Western Powers) Area Headquarters

Composed of representatives of all American (Western Powers) inspection units. Located so as to afford best control of the military districts which are within its jurisdiction. Directs, supports and processes the business of assigned military districts; assists and coordinates activities of attached personnel and of all others discharging inspection system responsibilities within its geographical area.

TOP SECRET

Military District Inspection Groups

Composed of representatives of all interested U. S. (Western Powers) elements. Located at Headquarters, Russian Military Districts. Ground Forces section conducts inspections of all specified activities within each Disclosure and Verification stage; remains constantly alert to and reports promptly any evidence of bad faith or hostile intent. Renders periodic report of findings; makes flash reports of significant repositioning of ground force units, undue supply buildup, indications of evasion or of clandestine operations.

Verification Teams

Operate within the delegated authority and responsibility of the District Inspection Group to which assigned. Principal duties are to (1) check and report on adequacy and accuracy of disclosed Army data at each stage; perform such other inspections as may be requested by other inspection groups, (2) and remain constantly alert to and report promptly all evidences of surprise attack.

Observer Teams

Operate within the authority and responsibility of the District Inspection Group to which assigned. Posted at selected key locations (such as mobilization points, supply depots, road, rail and telecommunications, airdromes, ports, troop locations. Principal duties are to (1) detect any significant violation of terms of agreement and to give early warning of evidences of evasion, hostile intent or clandestine operations; and, (2) assist in the accomplishment of verification functions to the extent that it does not interfere with their primary assignment.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRETAPPENDIX DSTATION LISTJOINT AND ARMY HEADQUARTERS OF THE INSPECTION SYSTEM

Headquarters	Name Military Dist.Groups	Location	*Army Personnel
International Arma- ments Commission		Switzerland	Unknown
U.S.(Western Powers) Inspection Hqrs.		Washington	115
U.S.(Western Powers) Inspection Mission		Moscow	109
✓ U.S.(Western Powers) Area Headquarters			
Northern European		Minsk	224
	Baltic	Riga	353
	Belorussian	Minsk	353
	Carpathian	L'vov	353
	Leningrad	Leningrad	353
	Northern	Petrozavodsk	353
Central		Moscow	224
	Moscow	Moscow	353
	Gorki	Gorki	353
	Volga	Kuybyshev	353
	White Sea	Archangel	353
Southern		Stalingrad	224
	Turkestan	Tasnkent	353
	South Ural	Chkalov	353
	North Caucasus	Rostov	353
	Trans Caucasus	Tiflis	353
Siberian		Novosibirsk	224
	East Siberia	Irkutsk	353
	West Siberia	Novosibirsk	353
	Ural	Sverdlovsk	353
Far East		Kahabarorsk	224
	Far East	Kahabarorsk	353
	Transbaikal	Chita	353
	Maritime	Vovoshilor	353

- 41 -

TOP SECRETAPPENDIX D

TOP SECRET

Headquarters	Name Military Dist.Groups	Location	*Army Personnel
Southern European		Kiev	224
	Kiev	Kiev	353
	Odessa	Odessa	353
	Tauric	Simferopol	353
	Voronezh	Voronezh	353
Satellite		E. Berlin	224
	E. Germany	Zossen Wundorf	353
	Poland	Liegnitz	353
	Czechoslovakia	Prague	353
	Hungary	Budapest	353
	Romania	Constanta	353
Totals:	Area Headquarters		1,568
	District Headquarters		9,884
	Mission Headquarters		109
	Inspection Headquarters		115
✓ TOTAL			11,676

*Exclusive of 1254 communications personnel
at fixed stations which Army may be re-
quired to furnish

Communications personnel all echelons 1,526

GRAND TOTAL 13,208

NOTES:

Communications requirements are:

a. Subject to reduction in accordance with the number of joint installations staffed on a pro rata basis by using elements.

b. Figures listed above represent requirements for normal continuing operations during the Stage I, assuming six months for completion. They will vary with the extent of coverage and the tempo of inspection processes in succeeding stages.

TOP SECRETAPPENDIX D

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX E

STAGES OF DISCLOSURES AND VERIFICATION

STAGE I

Disclose:

- a. Over-all manpower strength; composition (by component unit); disposition of regular and reserve military forces to include paramilitary, security and police forces.
- b. Planned maneuvers and large scale troop movements during the period covered by this stage.
- c. Location of military installations and mobilization facilities, (posts, camps, stations, training establishments, depots, ports, airdromes, rail and road centers) excluding nuclear, proving grounds, and research and development centers.
- d. Details of those parts of the budget which pertain to armed forces less allocations for Research and Development and for nuclear purposes.

Verify by:

- a. Analysis and evaluation of disclosed data supplemented by actual physical checks of troop units and installations by ground inspection teams. To complete the check and at the same time ascertain the basic military pattern but primarily to give early warning of pending attack, observers will be in place at critical points, i.e. mobilization centers, military depots, road and rail centers, telecommunications centers, airdromes, ports, guided missile centers, training areas on the date the agreement becomes effective.

- 43 -

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX E

TOP SECRET

b. Direct examination of the various installations (type of construction, physical dimensions, station overhead, power consumption, supplies on hand, traffic, type of activity, etc.) by ground inspection teams.

c. Examination and comparison of previous, present and proposed national budget and reconciliation of authorization with actual expenditures.

NOTE: (a), (b) and (c)--Inspectors and observers to have access to the entire national territory to the extent necessary to determine that all facilities and installations of type listed have been declared. They will be provided with facilities for uninterrupted communications. Aerial surveys will be permitted for same purpose and to same extent.

STAGE II

Disclose:

a. Plans and procedures for large scale mobilization of conventional means of warfare.

b. Detailed internal organization and composition of units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stage I.

c. Equipment (including reserve equipment of units making up over-all strength disclosed in Stage I, except units equipped with novel weapons).

d. Over-all annual capacity of heavy industry relating to armaments to include coal, steel, aluminum and electricity.

- 44 -

APPENDIX E

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Verify by:

- ✓ a. Examination of relevant documents.
- b. Analysis and evaluation of disclosed data in comparison with findings of observations in Stage I and supplemented by actual physical checks of units as considered necessary.
- c. Analysis of disclosed data in comparison with tables of organization and equipment supplemented by physical checks of units and installations.
- d. Cross-checks of pertinent statistics and employment records, access to plants, and analysis of operation with respect to materials used.

NOTE: (a) and (b): By aerial survey as stated in Stage I.

STAGE III

Disclose:

- a. Production facilities (military arsenals, civilian plants) for the manufacture of weapons and heavy equipment for units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stage I (excluding novel weapons) including location, type and quantity of armament produced, and maximum annual capacity.

Verify by:

- ✓ a. Actual physical inspection of plant to include observation of plant's physical dimensions, raw material on hand, end product, and labor force employed. Analyze these observations against available production records, input of raw material, power consumption, employment statistics and financial reports.

NOTE: (a) By aerial survey as stated in Stage I.

- 45 -
TOP SECRET

APPENDIX E